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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness. 
'The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately 
reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." State v. 
Cram, 2002 UT 37, Tf6,46 P.3d 230. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(a) (2001). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
This appeal contains issues relating to the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §78-3la-1, etseq. (2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This appeal is before this Court pursuant to this Court's grant of Wong's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Initially, the parties submitted a dispute, involving 
petitioner's first party insurance claim, to binding arbitration before Warren Driggs. The 
insurance contract contained policy limits of $100,000, but the arbitrator entered an award 
outside the policy limits, in the amount of $260,926.84 . Respondent contends, and the 
trial court and the Court of Appeals have unanimously agreed, that an arbitrator who is 
deciding a contract claim without any extra-contractual elements, must conform his or her 
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decision to the contract terms. In the arbitration below, the arbitrator could not award 
more than the insurance policy limits. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW. 
After petitioner refused to treat the arbitrator's decision as a determination 
of damages subject to the terms of the contract instead of an actual award, respondent 
Allstate Insurance Company followed the procedure outlined by Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
3la-14 and 78-3la-15 (1991) and submitted a motion to the Third District Court to have 
the award vacated or modified. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have 
determined that Wong could not recover in excess of the $100,000 limits provided in the 
contract. The trial court issued an Order granting Allstate the relief it sought. Wong 
appealed the trial court's Order to the Utah Court of Appeals. Although the Court of 
Appeals used a partially different approach than the trial court and disagreed with a 
portion of the trial court's analysis, the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, affirmed the trial 
court's determination that the arbitration award did not affect the terms of the parties' 
contract. Next, Wong petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which was granted. 
Pursuant to this Writ, this Court reviews the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, which is set 
forth at 2004 UT App 193, 93 P.3d 849. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
After settling his claim against the at fault driver's liability insurer, Wong 
made a claim against his own insurer, Allstate, to recover under the Underinsured 
Motorist provision ("UIM") of his contract for automobile insurance policy. (R. at 6,13-
14,142) Wong's UIM policy contained a contractual recovery limit of $100,000 per 
person. (R. at 22,142) Wong demanded the full amount provided by his policy. Allstate 
disagreed that the value of the claim reached the policy limits. As allowed by the terms 
of Wong's contract, Allstate contested whether Wong was entitled to recover the full 
$100,000 provided under the UIM Policy. (R. at 6) 
In order to resolve the dispute efficiently and without undue expense, the 
parties agreed to submit the matter to an arbitrator. Petitioner Wong was represented in 
the arbitration by Preston Handy of Siegfried & Jensen, and respondent Allstate was 
represented by Leonard McGee. As part of the arbitration process, counsel for the parties 
signed two documents: (1) an Arbitration Agreement (R. at 16-17) (referred to hereafter 
as the "first arbitration agreement" because it was negotiated first and signed first by Mr. 
Handy, although it was signed later by Mr. McGee); and (2) a Binding Arbitration 
Agreement with Warren W. Driggs, the arbitrator. (R at 18) In addition, petitioner and 
respondent were already parties to another agreement, i.e., the insurance contract 
providing the basis for UIM benefits. The first Arbitration Agreement addressed, almost 
exclusively, arbitration procedure matters; that Agreement did not set forth the specific 
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subject matter of the arbitration or the issues to be decided by the arbitrator. (R. at 16-17) 
Additionally, this agreement contained a clause referring to a "high/low" arrangement. 
(R. at 16). Wong's attorney (Mr. Handy) crossed out and initialed that portion of the 
agreement. (R. at 16). Although Mr. Handy eliminated the high/low provision, he 
specifically left the remainder of the clause, which prohibited disclosure of any pre-
arbitration agreements. (R. at 16). Allstate's attorney (Mr. McGee) signed the first 
arbitration agreement and sent a letter to Mr. Handy reiterating Allstatefs position that the 
policy limits would of course limit the total award. (R. at 58) 
In addition to the first procedural arbitration agreement, both parties signed 
a Binding Arbitration Agreement prepared by the arbitrator, Mr. Driggs, which listed the 
nature of the matter submitted for arbitration as "Underinsured Motorist Claim -
Damages." (R, at 18) As a result, both parties and the arbitrator knew this to be an 
arbitration of a contract claim, and that the arbitrator was to decide the value of Wong's 
damages resulting from the automobile accident. (R. at 18) In ADR practice, it is 
common for the arbitrator to perform such a limited role, and for the parties then to 
conform the arbitrator's decision to the insurance contract or other agreements the parties 
may have made. This second arbitration agreement was the only agreement disclosed to 
the arbitrator. (R. at 57-58) 
On May 14, 2002, Mr. Handy sent a letter to Mr. McGee discussing the 
nature of the upcoming arbitration. (R. at 57) The relevant portion of the letter states: 
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This letter is a follow-up to our recent conversation 
this morning regarding my client, Dixon Wong, and the 
upcoming arbitration. I want to confirm that our agreement 
pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement is that this matter will 
be arbitrated with no consideration for a binding high/low 
agreement. This is evidenced by the Arbitration Agreement 
signed by you well after the amendments/changes were made. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that nothing in Mr. 
Wong's contract of insurance with Allstate requires that he be 
bound by a high/low agreement. 
We have agreed that the arbitrator will not be made 
aware of either the terms of the Arbitration Agreement or the 
policy limits under the subject policy. In short, the arbitrator 
will be afforded the opportunity to award what he believes 
Mr. Wong's claim is worth, whatever that figure may be. 
(R. at 57 (emphasis added)). Upon receiving this letter, Mr. McGee responded the next 
day with a letter stating: 
I agree with you that there is not a high/low agreement 
in place regarding the upcoming arbitration in this matter; 
however, it is Allstate Insurance Company's position (as it 
has been from the beginning of this case) that Mr. Wong is 
still bound by the $100,000.00 contractual limit of his 
insurance policy, notwithstanding whatever amount the 
arbitrator may award. 
(R. at 58) No further correspondence was sent prior to arbitration, and the parties 
proceeded to arbitration the next day with an agreement not to disclose the arbitration 
agreement or evidence regarding the limits of Wong's contract for insurance. 
Furthermore, even though Mr. Driggs knew that this was a first party insurance contract 
claim, he did not ask for information regarding limits, presumably because of the frequent 
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ADR practice of the parties working out the details of payment after a decision had been 
reached. 
On May 16, 2002, an arbitration hearing was held before Warren Driggs. 
(R. at 6, 26) Neither party introduced the UIM insurance contract providing the basis for 
the arbitration, the first Arbitration Agreement, or the policy limits, and the arbitrator did 
not inquire further about the particular procedures to be followed in making his decision 
about "damages" as noted in his Binding Arbitration Agreement. On May 20, 2002, Mr. 
Driggs issued an award instead of a mere decision about the amount of damages, i.e., his 
Arbitration Award. (R. at 26-28) Mr. Driggs determined that Wong suffered damages in 
the amount of $321,616.84 as a result of the accident. (R. at 26-28) Mr. Driggs then used 
that amount as the beginning basis for his arbitration award, reduced that amount by the 
liability and PIP benefits previously paid to Mr. Wong, and entered net "award" of 
$260,926.84 in damages. (R. at 26-28) As reflected by the Arbitration Award, Mr. 
Driggs did not establish the amount of the UIM Policy limits nor tie his award to those 
limits, but simply entered an "award" based on the total amount of damages that he 
determined Mr. Wong to have suffered. (R. at 26-28) Thereafter, Wong refused to honor 
the parties' agreement, to recognize that he could not recover more than policy limits on a 
first party claim, and refused to accept the maximum contract amount. Allstate filed a 
Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's Award, or in the Alternative, Motion for Modification of 
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Arbitrator's Award, in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah on June 10, 2002. 
(R. at 1-28) 
The district court heard oral argument on Allstate's motion on October 31, 
2002. (R. at 156) The court ruled in favor of Allstate and corrected the arbitration award 
by reducing it to the full policy limits. (R. at 15, pp.24-26) In reaching this 
determination, the court stated: 
[T]he suggestion that entering into an arbitration 
matter somehow opened the door to an unlimited claim, I find 
just [to be] outside of the scope of the relationship of the 
parties or any reasonable expectation. 
It seemed to me that in looking at the language of the 
statute, that both the provision that allows the Court to vacate 
or modify on the basis of the arbitrator's exceeding the 
power-its power, or exceeding its authority, and going 
beyon4 what is within reason or with fact, those sustain the 
Court's decision. 
Policy limits are the contractual determinations of the 
parties as to what they are being insured against, and the 
suggestion that somehow this is changed by submitting the 
matter to arbitration without advising the arbitrator of that 
limit to me just does not make any sense in logic or reason. It 
would be something that an insurance company would be 
giving up without any basis. It just doesn't make any sense to 
this Court. 
It seems to me there might-may be reasons to enter 
into an arbitration without advising the arbitrator of the 
parameters of the relationship of the parties, simply to insure 
the arbitrator had an opportunity to deal with the issues with 
objectivity, without being influenced by any numbers, and it 
seems to me that that may be the basis for the arbitration 
agreement framed as it was, without the terms more 
specifically identified. 
My suspicion is that in the future that will not be the 
case, but in this case it seems to me clear that that contractual 
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amount, that policy limit, define[s] the outer limits of the 
insurance coverage offered. 
(R at 156, pp.25-26) 
On December 16, 2002, the district court entered an Order Granting 
Petitioner's Motion to Modify Arbitrator's Award. Of relevance, the Order provides that 
the underinsured motorist policy constitutes a contract, and 
that the policy limits of $100,000 define the outer extent of 
exposure to petitioner, Allstate Insurance Company, on a 
claim for underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration 
award in excess of the $100,000 policy limits was beyond the 
reasonable expectation of the parties. The Arbitation 
Agreement did not operate to open or modify the terms of the 
insurance contract. 
(R. at 142-43) The court further held that in accordance with case law and statutes, "the 
arbitrator exceeded his authority and power by entering an award in excess of $100,000, 
that the award is beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties, and that the award 
lacks adequate foundation in reason or fact." (R. at 143) Finally, the Order provided that 
"the insurance policy limits of $100,000 constitute a contractual determination of the 
parties, which are not modified or altered by virtue of the arbitration agreements." (R. at 
143) On January 8, 2003, Wong filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. at 149-150) 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals agreed with the result of the trial 
court's decision, but found that the trial court erred in its modification of the arbitrator's 
award. See Allstate v. Wong, 2004 UT App 193 at 1f9. The Court of Appeals held that 
the trial court's finding of the arbitrator s exceeding his authority would have required 
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vacating the arbitration award, then resubmitting the matter to arbitration (in which case 
the outcome would be the same as the result reached by the trial court and Court of 
Appeals). See id. Ultimately, though, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that 
"the arbitration did not modify the original contractual obligations of the parties . . . ." 
Allstate v. Wong. 2004 UT App 193 at f 15. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals 
determined the parties' contract limited Wong's recovery to the limits of the contract and 
affirmed the trial court's conclusion. 
Wong then petitioned this Court for certiorari, which was granted. In his 
petition to this Court, Wong raised the following issues: (I) "Did the Court of Appeals err 
in affirming the trial court's decision to modify the arbitrator's award when the 
modification was not done pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act?"; and (II) "Does an 
insurance policy limit act as the ceiling on an arbitration award where there was no 
agreement to limit the award and the policy limit was not introduced into evidence and 
before the arbitrator?" 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
At all levels of review, the courts have recognized the parties to this case 
had a binding contract which defined the contractual limits of recovery. On certiorari to 
this Court, Wong is again requesting Utah's courts to rewrite his contract of insurance to 
provide him with a benefit to which he is not entitled and for which he paid or provided 
no consideration. Wong paid premiums for $100,000 in UIM coverage, not $260,926.84. 
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Wong's arguments undermine the very heart of Utah's system of alternative dispute 
resolution, and request this Court to compromise the efficient and expeditious system by 
which parties are able to resolve disputes. Instead, Wong advocates a system of 
trapdoors, pitfalls and formal dealings. Arbitration is used to avoid costly and time-
consuming litigation. Arbitration proceedings are almost always faster and less formal 
than formal litigation, with greater predictability of results. In order to obtain a windfall 
for which he did not bargain, Wong would like this Court to expose arbitration parties to 
results that they never contemplated. Such a risk would be so significant that many 
parties would refuse to participate in arbitration, resulting in a shift from ADR back to 
overburdening the courts. 
ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE I 
THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN WONG'S BRIEF ARE INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION AND ARE OUTSIDE THE STANDARD 
OF REVIEW ON CERTIORARI. 
"On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not the 
decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
Furthermore, this Court's review "is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the 
petitions." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. RusselL 966 P.2d 852. 856 (Utah 1998). This Court 
has explained this standard as it applies to briefs as follows: "the briefs of the parties 
should address the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court." 
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Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992). Under this standard of review, 
the issues on certiorari must relate to the Court of Appeals1 opinion and must be set forth 
in the petition for certiorari. 
In his petition for certiorari, Wong presented issues as follows: (I) "Did the 
Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's decision to modify the arbitrator's award 
when the modification was not done pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act?"; and (II) 
"Does an insurance policy limit act as the ceiling on an arbitration award where there was 
no agreement to limit the award and the policy limit was not introduced into evidence and 
before the arbitrator?" Wong's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1. 
In his opening brief to this Court, however, Wong apparently decided to 
drop these issues. See Wong's Brief at pp. ii, 1. In his brief, Wong's sole argument is not 
the same as either the issues in his Petition or the Court of Appeals' opinion. The new 
question Wong presents is: "Whether the net amount to be paid for the underinsured 
damages of the petitioner, insofar as those damages potentially exceeded the policy limits, 
was a matter submitted to the arbitrator by the parties' arbitration agreement." Wong's 
Brief at 1. Wong's arguments in his brief on certiorari attempt to raise matters not 
addressed by the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, this new question is replete with 
misleading implications and confusion. There is no dispute that the arbitrator had 
authority to set the value of Wong's damages at any amount he considered appropriate. 
Wong, however, is attempting to construe documents to suggest that the parties submitted 
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to the arbitrator a question of whether he could recover in excess of his policy. 
Unfortunately, the record does not support Wong because the parties never agreed to 
submit the issue of the parties' contract to the arbitrator. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion does not discuss the scope of the issue or 
whether the total amount of damages was an issue submitted to the arbitrator. The first 
part of the opinion addresses whether the trial court acted properly in modifying the 
arbitrator's award. The Court of Appeals held "the trial court should have modified the 
arbitrator's award to reflect the matter submitted to arbitration and entered the total 
amount of damages incurred by Wong as $321,616.85." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wong, 2004 
UT App 193,1J14, 93 P.3d 849. By that statement, the Court of Appeals agreed with 
Wong that the amount of damages at arbitration was $321,616.85, as Wong would like 
this Court to determine. Regardless of the amount of the arbitration award and whether 
the trial court properly or improperly modified the award, the Court of Appeals went on 
to rule that the maximum amount Allstate was required to pay was set by the parties' 
contract of insurance. See id. at f 15. Because the parties' contract of insurance capped 
Wong's recovery at $100,000, he could only recover that amount, notwithstanding the 
amount of damages sustained. The arbitrator was not asked to decide the amount of 
Wong's ultimate recovery. Accordingly, the only issue which would bear on the amount 
Wong is entitled to receive is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial 
court's conclusion that the arbitrator's determination of damages and the arbitration award 
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did not affect the parties' contract of insurance. Wong has not addressed this issue in his 
brief. Because Wong has not raised this issue in his brief, this Court should not grant him 
the relief he seeks. 
ISSUE II 
ALLSTATE NEVER AGREED TO SUBMIT THE AMOUNT OF WONGfS 
RECOVERY TO THE ARBITRATOR. 
A. If Both Parties Did Not Agree to Arbitrate an Issue, Any Arbitration 
Award on the Issue Should be Vacated. 
Contrary to Wong's argument, the parties1 never agreed in any documents 
that the Arbitrator would decide the amount Wong was entitled to recover from Allstate 
under his UIM policy. At best from Wong's perspective, the documents and 
correspondence indicate the parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds as to the scope 
of the issue submitted to the arbitrator. Specifically, the parties exchanged 
correspondence shortly before arbitration which set forth the issues submitted. In its 
letter to Wong's counsel, Allstate set forth its understanding of the scope of the issue 
submitted to the arbitrator and also the effect of the parties' contract on any arbitration 
award. Wong did not dispute or attempt to clarify Allstate's understanding of the issue 
submitted. Accordingly, Allstate submitted to arbitration with the following 
understanding: (1) the parties agreed to not disclose the first arbitration agreement; (2) the 
parties agreed to not disclose the insurance contract or any of its terms, including limits 
on Wong's recovery, to the arbitrator; (3) the arbitrator would determine the amount of 
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Wongfs damages; and (4) if Wong's damages, as determined by the arbitrator, exceeded 
the limits of his policy, Wong could only recover the full amount of his policy-$ 100,000. 
If this Court were to determine that the parties never came to a meeting of 
the minds on the scope of the issue as set forth in the arbitration agreements, the 
appropriate remedy would be to vacate the award pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-
14(l)(e) and remand the matter for a new arbitration agreement and new arbitration 
proceeding. A second arbitration, however, could not produce a result whereby Wong 
recovers any more than the amount of his policy. 
B. If Both Parties Did Not Agree to Arbitrate an Issue, Any Arbitration 
Award on the Issue Should be Vacated. 
Throughout the history of this case, Wong has attempted to evade the limits 
of the insurance contract to which he voluntarily entered. On certiorari to this Court, 
Wong is once again requesting this Court to re-write his contract and give him a benefit 
for which he never paid consideration, i.e., premiums. The insurance contract, however, 
defines the parties* relationship and rights, and without it, Wong has no basis for recovery 
against Allstate. Accordingly, Wong asks this Court both to enforce the contract and to 
re-write its provisions to allow him to recover in excess of its plain language. Although 
the Court of Appeals did not address this issue, Wong's brief solely focuses on this 
attempt. Because Allstate considers this issue to be important in relation to the continued 
viability of arbitration, the merits of this issue are set forth below. 
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Wong's basic argument is that Allstate agreed to submit the amount of its 
contractual obligation to Wong at the arbitration. The documents, however, do not 
support Wong's position. Furthermore, Wong's position makes no sense; the parties had a 
binding contract for insurance which established a cap on Wong's recovery at $100,000. 
Wong has never provided any consideration nor reason why Allstate could possibly owe 
Wong more than those limits, nor why Allstate would agree to open the amount of its 
contractual obligation to determination by an arbitrator. No party ever disputed the 
presence or terms of the contract for insurance. Both parties knew the contract limited 
Wong's recovery to $100,000; the only issue was how much of the $100,000 Wong was 
entitled to receive. 
In order to properly evaluate the parties' intent regarding the issue 
submitted to arbitration, four documents are critical to understanding the parties' 
agreement. Wong's effort to construe these documents, particularly the first arbitration 
agreement, to support his position is fatally flawed, however, because the first agreement 
was not disclosed to the arbitrator. (R. at 57, 58) It is well-settled that "a court must 
review the submission agreement and determine whether the arbitrator's award covers 
areas not contemplated by the submission agreement. 'It is . . . fundamental that the 
authority of the arbitrator springs from the agreement to arbitrate.'" Buzas Baseball Inc. 
v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 949 (Utah 1996) (alterations in original) 
(citation omitted). As set forth in the parties' arbitration agreement and contemporaneous 
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correspondence, Allstate never agreed to submit any issue purporting to allow Wong to 
recover more than the limits of his contract for insurance. In addition, because the first 
arbitration agreement was not disclosed, the arbitrator could not have relied on that 
agreement to determine the scope of the issue submitted or his authority. 
Wong relies heavily on the first Arbitration Agreement (R. at 16-17) to 
support his claim that Allstate agreed to submit the amount of Wongfs recovery to the 
arbitrator. This document, however, indicates no such intent. Because the arbitrator 
never saw it, he could not have relied on it to determine the scope of his assignment in the 
arbitration. First, the content of the document is entirely procedural in nature. The 
document is silent as to the nature of the dispute, the issue submitted or the scope of the 
arbitrator's authority. The subject matter of the arbitration can be gleaned only in part, 
through inference, from the agreement itself. Above the title "Arbitration Agreement," 
there is a reference to "Wong v. Allstate Insurance" and "1314425263.1," which is an 
Allstate claim number. Paragraph K provides that by entering into the agreement, the 
parties are waiving their right to "formal legal action" on any claims related to the 
"accident of Friday, June 01, 2001." Paragraph I, substantially interlineated and initialed 
by Preston Handy but not by Leonard McGee, originally provided for a "high/low" 
agreement. Unfortunately, neither of the attorneys included a reference to the claim as 
one for Underinsured Motorist benefits, nor directly cited the insurance policy. On the 
other hand, Wong had no claim against Allstate with regard to the June 1, 2001 accident, 
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for anything other than UIM benefits. In any event, neither attorney provided the first 
arbitration agreement to the arbitrator. 
As the basis for his arguments that this first arbitration agreement provided 
authority to the arbitrator to award more than the contractual limits, Wong relies on the 
unilaterally modified language of Paragraph I of the document. Mr. Handy lined out the 
high/low provision, changing the paragraph so that it read: "The terms of this agreement 
shall not be disclosed to the arbitrator." Both parties then signed this document, and the 
attorneys did not provide the agreement to the arbitrator. 
Two days prior to the arbitration, Mr. Handy sent Allstate's arbitration 
counsel, Len McGee, a letter contending that the parties had no high/low agreement in 
place and that the policy limits of Wong's contract for insurance would not be disclosed to 
the arbitrator. (R. at 57) The next day, i.e., one day prior to the arbitration, Mr. McGee 
sent Mr. Handy a letter outlining Allstate's intent in entering into the arbitration 
agreement: 
I agree with you that there is not a high/low agreement in 
place regarding the upcoming arbitration in this matter; 
however, it is Allstate Insurance Company's position (as it 
has been from the beginning of this case) that Mr. Wong is 
still bound by the $100,000.00 contractual limit of his 
insurance policy, notwithstanding whatever amount the 
arbitrator may award. 
(R. at 58) Wong did not dispute Allstate's understanding of the arbitration agreement and 
proceeded with the arbitration the next day. Furthermore, notwithstanding the post-
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arbitration disagreement and confusion regarding the arbitration agreement, Wong has 
never explained any basis for claiming more than the policy limits. Wong has never 
suggested that Allstate had any reason to think that the arbitration could expose it to 
liability exceeding its contractual responsibility. In fact, Allstate never would have 
proceeded with the arbitration if it had suspected that arbitration could possibly produce a 
greater exposure than formal litigation. Undoubtedly, the same would be true of any 
party who agrees to submit to arbitration. 
Allstate entered the arbitration with the understanding that the arbitrator 
would determine the amount of Wong's damages without either party's disclosing the 
amount of the policy limits of Wong's contract for insurance. Consistent with this 
arrangement, the arbitrator had the parties execute a Binding Arbitration Agreement. (R. 
at 18) Unlike the first arbitration agreement, this document contemplated the nature of 
the parties' arbitration and the issue submitted to the arbitrator. Specifically, the 
agreement described the matter as follows: "Underinsured Motorist Claim - Damages." 
(R. at 18). The arbitration agreement did not specify that any issue regarding contractual 
obligations or limits would be submitted to the arbitrator. (R. at 18) In addition to being 
the only arbitration agreement to address the issue submitted to the arbitrator, it was the 
only arbitration agreement disclosed to the arbitrator. 
Wong's argument that the first arbitration agreement defined the scope of 
the arbitrator's authority is not accurate. The first agreement did not define the issue 
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submitted, and was not disclosed to the arbitrator. The Binding Arbitration Agreement 
prepared by the arbitrator, however, did define the issue submitted as a contract claim to 
determine damages sustained. Finally, the parties exchanged correspondence in which 
both parties agreed not to submit evidence of the parties' contract with the limitation 
stated by Mr. McGee that recovery was subject to the contractual limits. The Court of 
Appeals properly concluded the first arbitration agreement did not affect the parties' 
contract, and limited Wong's recovery to the insurance contract terms. 
C. Wong's Hands Are Not Clean. 
Nevertheless, Wong argues Allstate waived its defense that he was limited 
to the terms of his contract for insurance. On this point, Allstate believes Wong is 
seeking what amounts to allegedly equitable relief while he comes to the court with 
unclean hands. See, e.g., Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 1999 UT 100, f34, 
989 P.2d 1077 (holding Utah law prevents a party from inducing action or inaction and 
then benefitting from that action or inaction). Allstate does not dispute the parties had 
agreed not to introduce the contract for insurance or its terms at the arbitration. (R, at 16-
17, 57, 58). Wongfs argument is that by honoring this agreement, Allstate submitted the 
issue of the total amount of Wong's recovery to the arbitrator, including the risk of the 
arbitrator's invalidating the contractual policy limits without reason or basis. By inducing 
Allstate to agree not to submit evidence of Wong's contract for insurance at arbitration, 
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Wong is estopped from arguing that he is entitled to recover in excess of his contract for 
insurance. 
Allstate understood Wong did not want the arbitrator to be influenced in 
determining the amount of damage Wong sustained by the presentation of policy limits. 
If the arbitrator had known the amount of limits, Wong was apparently concerned that the 
arbitrator would attempt to award an amount less than those limits in order to appease the 
defending party. Often, parties will agree to not present contracts for insurance to the 
arbitrator in order to preserve the arbitrator's objectivity. See, e.g., Applehans v. Farmers 
InsJExch., 68 P.3d 594 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003); Tellkamp v. Wolverine Mut. Ins. Co., 556 
N.W.2d 504 (Mich. App. 1996) (providing that agreement not to inform arbitrator of 
policy limits for uninsured motorist coverage did not amount to a waiver of those limits); 
Brijmohan v. State Farm Ins. Coverage, 239 A.2d 496, 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) 
(providing that insurer did not waive its objection that arbitrator exceeded his power by 
waiting to assert objection until opposing confirmation of award). 
In the context of arbitrating liability under a motor vehicle insurance policy, 
the Utah Legislature has recognized the benefits of not disclosing the amount of an 
applicable contract of insurance. Specifically, the presence of an insurance policy maybe 
disclosed to the arbitration panel, but the amount of the policy may not be disclosed. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(9)(h) (emphasis added). Consistent with this objective of 
providing a fair, neutral and objective review or a claimant's damages, Allstate and Wong 
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agreed prior to arbitration that the amount of Wong's contractual limits would not be 
submitted to the arbitrator. 
On appeal, Wong now asserts that he effectively trapped Allstate into 
paying more than it is contractually obligated to pay because it honored the parties1 pre-
arbitration agreement. Although Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(9)(i) does not govern 
this issue, it is nevertheless instructive: "The amount of the arbitration award may not 
exceed the liability limits of all the defendant's applicable liability insurance policies, 
including applicable liability umbrella policies. If the initial arbitration award exceeds 
the liability limits of all applicable liability insurance policies, the arbitration award shall 
be reduced to an amount equal to the liability limits of all applicable liability insurance 
policies." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(9)(i) (emphasis added). Although this 
language does not directly apply, the principle does, even more in a first-party insurance 
claim than in a third-party liability claim. After the arbitration "award" was issued in an 
amount in excess of Wong's contractual limits, Allstate immediately tendered the full 
$100,000 policy limits to Wong through counsel. Allstate understood the "award" as a 
determination of Wong's damages, and because that amount exceeded the policy limits, it 
expected to pay the limits in their entirety. Wong rejected Allstate's tender and demanded 
the full amount of the arbitration award. 
As set forth below, Allstate was then forced to seek judicial intervention to 
enforce the parties' arbitration agreement and contract for insurance. Both the trial court 
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and Court of Appeals recognized the arbitration award did not affect the terms of the 
parties' contract of insurance. Even if one or both arbitration agreements were 
ambiguous, the parties were still subject to the terms of their other agreement, i.e., the 
insurance contract. That insurance policy was not unclear in the least, and the parties 
never expressed any intent to repudiate any part of that contract. Allstate respectfully 
requests that this court affirm the Court of Appeals' determination that Wong's recovery 
is capped at $100,000.00. 
D. Allstate Properly Moved to Have the Arbitration Award Modified or 
Vacated. 
i. The Arbitrator Exceeded His Authority to the Extent the 
Arbitration Award Purported to Set the Amount of Wong's 
Recovery. 
Faced with an arbitration award which could be turned into a judgment, see 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3la-13 & -16 (2001)1, and an arbitrator who had entered an 
"award" instead of a decision specifying the amount of damages only, Allstate had no 
choice but to seek judicial relief. Accordingly, Allstate filed what it believed to be the 
most expeditious and proper method for relief- a motion to vacate or modify the 
1
 All references are to the Arbitration Act in effect at the time the arbitration 
agreement was signed. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-131 (requiring arbitration 
agreements to be enforced pursuant to the version in effect when the arbitration 
agreement is signed). Accordingly, the references are to the prior version of the 
Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-1 etseq. (2001). 
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arbitration award pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31 a-
14 &-15 (2001). 
In requesting the trial court to vacate or modify the arbitration award, 
Allstate argued the award should be vacated because it exceeded the arbitrator's authority, 
or in the alternative, that the award should be modified because it was based on a matter 
not submitted to the arbitrator, i.e., the parties submitted the issue of "damages" as 
indicated in the Binding Arbitration Agreement, not the issue of the amount to be paid by 
Allstate. The Court of Appeals held the trial court reached the correct result, but used an 
incorrect procedure in first finding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority, then 
modifying the arbitration award instead of vacating it.2 Notwithstanding the Court of 
Appeals1 dicta regarding filing a declaratory judgment action, modification or vacation of 
the arbitrator's award to conform with Wong's contract for insurance was appropriate and 
authorized by statute. 
2
 The Court of Appeals decision, footnote 6, indicates that "a better way to reach 
the same correct result would have been for Allstate to file a declaratory action asking the 
court to determine the effect of the arbitrator's award on Allstate's obligation to pay 
Wong, its insured under the policy." See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wong. 2004 UT App 193, 
TJ15 n.6, 93 P.3d 849. In fact, an action for declaratory relief would have been much less 
preferable and expeditious, because such an action may entail discovery, delays during 
discovery, and the possibility that the court may elect to hold a trial instead of deciding 
the matter on motion. As a result, a declaratory judgment action would be more 
expensive and would probably take longer. The issue in this case was simple and 
straightforward, and fully susceptible of being resolved by the means provided by the 
Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3la-14 & -15 (2002). 
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In Buzas Baseball, this Court outlined when an arbitration award should be 
changed by the court. Under either Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3la-14 or -15, an award 
should be vacated or modified if the award exceeds the arbitrator's authority or is based 
on a matter not submitted to the arbitrator. In order to determine if an award exceeds an 
arbitrator's authority, a court reviews the submission agreement and ,fdetermine[s] 
whether the arbitrator's award covers areas not contemplated by the submission 
agreement." Buzas Baseball 925 P.2d at 949. 
As discussed above, nothing in the parties' arbitration agreement 
contemplated that the legitimacy, effectiveness or application of the policy limits was 
being submitted to the arbitrator for decision. The arbitration was limited to determining 
the amount of damages Wong suffered, not Wong's ultimate recovery as a result of those 
damages. Specifically, the Binding Arbitration Agreement prepared by the arbitrator and 
signed by the parties indicated the issue as: "Underinsured Motorist Claim - Damages." 
(R. at 18) Despite that limited subject matter, Wong attempts to misconstrue the first 
arbitration agreement, which was not disclosed to the arbitrator, to argue Allstate agreed 
to submit the issue of Wong's recovery to the arbitrator. Even if the first agreement had 
been submitted to the arbitrator, it still would not have that effect. The language used by 
Wong, from Paragraph I, was revised by Mr. Handy to read: "The terms of this agreement 
shall not be disclosed to the arbitrator." In actuality, what Wong is arguing is that his 
unilateral interlineation of the high/low provision should be interpreted not as a mere 
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cancellation of certain terms, but as an affirmative statement that Allstate agreed the 
policy limits to be inapplicable. In doing so, Wong ignores Mr. McGee's correspondence 
to the contrary exchanged before the arbitration hearing, as well the unchallenged fact 
that Allstate had no reason whatsoever to agree to any such terms. 
Wong argues that the second arbitration agreement (the arbitrator's Binding 
Arbitration Agreement) only related to the arbitrator's fees. See Wongfs Brief at p.9. 
Contrary to Wongfs assertion, nothing in this document limits its force and effect to the 
arbitrator's fees. Specifically, the Binding Arbitration Agreement states the following: 
The parties hereafter named agree that the following dispute 
shall be the subject of binding arbitration at a time to be set by 
mutual agreement. 
Nature of Dispute 
Underinsured Motorist Claim - Damages. 
(R, at 18) The document was then signed by counsel for the parties. (R, at 18) The 
arbitrator's fee agreement is a separate document, with separate signatures and a different 
date. 
Notwithstanding the language on the Binding Arbitration Agreeement, 
Wong asserts two procedural arguments to support his claim that the parties intended to 
submit the amount of Wong's recovery to the arbitrator. Neither argument, however, is 
supported by the parties' documents or conduct. Wong argues the following points: (1) if 
the arbitration were really intended only to determine damages, then it was preliminary in 
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nature and required subsequent litigation (see Wong's Brief at 9-10); (2) Wong's contract 
for insurance was an affirmative defense which must be raised at arbitration or it is 
waived (see Wong's Brief at 10, 13). 
As the documents indicate, though, both parties agreed that evidence of the 
limits of Wong's contract for insurance would not be presented to the arbitrator. (R. at 
16-17) However, Allstate consistently maintained that Wong's recovery, regardless of 
the arbitration award, was limited by his contract of insurance. (R. at 57, 58) No 
additional litigation was required if the arbitrator had limited his decision to the subject 
matter of the arbitration presented to him. Upon a determination of the amount of 
damages, the parties should have been able to resolve the resulting policy limits payment 
between them, or if they required further assistance, they could have then submitted the 
insurance policy information to the arbitrator and asked him to reduce his decision to an 
award consistent with that contract and the arbitration agreements. Litigation would have 
been necessary only if the parties could not have finalized the matter in one of those 
ways. As the parties' documents indicate and consistent with the related procedure set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(9)(i), if the arbitration award exceed the limits of 
Wong's contract, then the award would be modified by the parties to reflect the limits. No 
further litigation was required; it simply required both parties to act in good faith and to 
recognize the terms of the contract. 
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In addition, Allstate was honoring Wong's request, as evidenced by the 
interlineation of the first arbitration agreement, not to submit evidence of the policy at 
arbitration. Allstate was entitled to present the insurance contract as evidence, but 
thought it was accommodating a reasonable request of Wong in foregoing that right. 
Allstate did not believe that Wong and his counsel could legitimately contend that they 
were entitled to more than the amount of benefits for which Wong had paid premiums. If 
Wong intended for the arbitrator to determine whether his contract for insurance limited 
his recovery, i.e., if he thought there was some reason for rewriting the insurance 
contract, then Wong, not Allstate, had the affirmative obligation to identify such as an 
issue for the arbitration and to introduce evidence justifying that revision of the insurance 
policy. The policy limits were neither an affirmative defense nor are there typically 
formal pleadings in arbitration as they would be in litigation. In fact, given Wong's 
request that policy limits not be disclosed to the arbitrator, it is difficult to imagine how 
Allstate could have raised policy limits during the arbitration at all. Wong asked Allstate 
to agree not to disclose limits, then argues that Allstate must have used limits as a defense 
to avoid an extra-contractual liability that was never presented to the arbitrator. Allstate 
acted in good faith by not submitting evidence of the limits of Wong's contract for 
insurance in order to allow the arbitrator to make an objective determination of damages. 
Any award was then subject to the limits of Wong's contract for insurance. 
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In Buzas Baseball this Court cited Eljer Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kowin 
Development Corp., 14 F.3d 1250 (7th Cir. 1994) for the proposition that an arbitrator 
exceeds his authority if the award resolves a dispute not subject to the arbitration 
agreement. See Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949. This Court remarked: "The proper test 
under the exceeding authority ground is 'whether the arbitrator exceeded the powers 
delegated to him by the parties.1" Id (quoting Eljer, 14 F.3d at 1256). As the arbitration 
documents indicate, Allstate never intended to submit, and never in fact submitted, any 
issue of whether Wong's could recover in excess of his contract for insurance. The 
documents indicate the only issue submitted was the amount of Wong's damages. The 
first arbitration agreement was not disclosed to the arbitrator and could not be 
determinative of the arbitrator's authority. Furthermore, the arbitrator's Binding 
Arbitration Agreement, from which he derived his authority, limited the scope of the issue 
to Wong's damages only. Accordingly, any part of the award which purported to reform 
the insurance contract or interpret the amount of Allstate's contractual liability was in 
excess of the arbitrator's authority. 
ii. The Arbitration Award is Irrational. 
In addition to exceeding the arbitrator's authority because he decided an 
issue that was not submitted for arbitration, this Court has also held that an arbitrator 
exceeds his authority when "an award is 'without foundation in reason or fact,. . . . '" 
Buzas, 925 P.2d at 950. This court explained this ground for vacating an award as 
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follows: "The assumption is that the parties, by their agreement to arbitrate, have given 
the arbitrator the authority to decide their dispute on a rational basis.11 Id, This Court 
further stated, "an award may not stand if it does not meet the test of fundamental 
rationality." Id. 
In this respect, Wong paid no consideration to recover above the limits of 
his contract for insurance. Wong chose his coverage amount and paid Allstate premiums 
based on that selected level of coverage. Wong's premiums were based on limits of 
$100,000. In other words, Allstate had no basis for agreeing to submit the amount of 
Wong's recovery to the arbitrator. Wong and his counsel have never expressed any legal 
or factual basis allowing an extra-contractual recovery, other than their artifice and 
trickery in trying to proceed to arbitration with arbitration agreements that they now 
believe to be ambiguous enough to support their strained interpretation. Setting the 
agreements aside for a moment, Wong simply had no basis for a right or claim of any 
recovery exceeding his policy limits, and never paid consideration for any such recovery. 
An arbitration award which purported to allow Wong to recover in excess of the terms of 
the parties1 contract was irrational. Accordingly, the arbitration award should be vacated 
as irrational and unsupported by any basis in law or fact. 
iii. Interpretation of Wong's Contract for Insurance Was Not Submitted 
to the Arbitrator. 
The arbitration award should be modified because it purports to award 
damages based on an issue not submitted to arbitration. As stated, the parties entered into 
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a pre-arbitration agreement to not disclose the amount of the limits of Wong's contract for 
insurance. Based on this agreement, Allstate did not offer any evidence of the policy 
limits. However, if Wong intended to dispute the applicability of the terms of his 
contract, he also failed to offer any evidence of the terms of the contract, any reason for 
reforming the contract, or invalidating that part of the contract establishing a limit of 
recovery. Accordingly, the issue of the applicability of Wong's contract for insurance as 
it related to Wong's ultimate recovery was simply not submitted at arbitration. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3 la-15(b) (2001) (allowing modification of the award where the award is 
based on a matter not submitted to arbitration). Because the terms of the contract are 
straightforward and speak for themselves, Allstate had no reason to submit the issue to 
the arbitrator for his consideration. Instead, Allstate honored Wong's request to not 
disclose the information in order to allow the arbitrator to make an objective 
determination of damages. 
Thus, the arbitration award could not change the terms of Wong's contract 
for insurance. Because the contract for insurance both provides for Wong's recovery and 
limits the amount he can recover, Wong is limited to the terms of the contract. As the 
Court of Appeals recognized, the arbitration agreement did not modify the contract. To 
the extent the arbitration award purported to allow Wong to recover in excess of his 
contract, the award must be modified because it addressed an issue not submitted to 
arbitration. 
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E. Neither Utah Law Nor Other Jurisdictions Support Wongfs Contention 
that the Contract for Insurance Must Be Introduced At Arbitration. 
The majority of courts examining this issue have adopted the same 
reasoning as the Court of Appeals1 opinion; namely, an arbitration award does not modify 
the limits of a contract for insurance. In reviewing an arbitrator's award, this Court noted 
the policies that govern this review: "Parties contemplating arbitration must be assured 
that the arbitration will proceed according to established standards that both sides deem to 
be fair and just." Pacific Development v. Orton. 2001 UT 36, fl2, 23 P.3d 1035. 
Furthermore, this Court stated: "The parties must know the boundaries of the subject 
matter of the dispute submitted and the potential liabilities flowing therefrom before they 
are able to intelligently waive their rights to submit their disputes to formal litigation." 
IcLatfB. 
In Orton, defendant made a similar argument to Wong in this appeal 
regarding the scope of arbitration and the evidence presented. In Orton, defendant argued 
that the evidence presented was beyond the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement 
and the presentation of this evidence modified the scope of the arbitration. See id. at ^ f8-
14. In rejecting this argument, this Court explained that the arbitration agreement was 
essentially a contract which could only be modified in writing. See id. at f 11. This Court 
enforced the original scope of the arbitration agreement, stating: "To allow modification 
of an express written agreement by less than a similarly explicit intent would simply 
circumvent the statutory requirements and the policies they vindicate." Id at |14. The 
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case at bar contains a factual situation much more compelling than Orton, because neither 
arbitration agreement provided a basis for challenging the terms of the insurance contract, 
nor did the evidence presented at arbitration go to any question of reforming or 
invalidating the insurance contract. Wong cannot unilaterally modify the parties' 
arbitration agreement to cover issues not identified. Wong's contract for insurance was 
not an issue submitted to arbitration. 
As support for his argument that the district court acted improperly in 
modifying the award, Wong cites a series of Colorado decisions. A careful reading of 
even these opinions, however, supports Allstate's position. Specifically, the Colorado 
opinions, like Buzas, Soft Solutions v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095, 
and Orton, turn on the scope of the arbitration agreement and whether or not the parties 
had an agreement to disclose the policy limits to the arbitrator. See Kutch v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 93 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) (holding insurer's failure to 
timely appeal award barred defense of policy limits); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Taylor, 45 
P.3d 759 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (finding arbitration agreement specifically granted 
arbitrator authority to determine amount of recovery under policy and no agreement 
existed preventing insurer from presenting evidence of policy limits at arbitration); 
Applehans v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 68 P.3d 594 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (remanding case 
for determination of whether agreement not to present policy limits was present and 
requiring award be vacated if parties agreed not to present policy limits at arbitration). 
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Like the Utah opinions, Colorado courts look at the scope of the issue submitted and the 
parties' agreements regarding the evidence submitted. 
Finally, other courts faced with this issue have similarly held that an 
arbitrator exceeds his authority in making an award in excess of the insurance policy 
limits. See, e.g., Brijmohan v. State Farm Insurance Coverage, 239 A.D.2d 496,496-97 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (providing arbitration award in excess of amount available under 
automobile liability policy is subject to vacatur as an award in excess of arbitrator's 
powers); Mele v. General Accident Insurance Company, 198 A.D.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1993) (concluding that arbitrators lacked authority to make award in excess of policy 
limits); State Farm Insurance Company v. Credle, 228 A.D.2d 191 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) 
(award made in excess of the contractual limits of an insurance policy is an action in 
excess of authority); Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Straw, 293 N.W.2d 
704, 705 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming trial court's decision to "vacate[] that portion 
of the award which exceeded the $20,000 policy limit of defendant's insurance as an 
unlawful exercise by the arbitrators of equity jurisdiction"); Bernard v. Detroit 
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 350 N.W.2d 847, 851 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) 
(holding arbitrators committed error of law by not giving effect to insurance policy 
provision, thereby exceeding their powers, and arbitration award should have been 
vacated). This point is also made clear in Couch on Insurance 3d, wherein it states: "An 
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award which renders relief in excess of that allowed by the policy exceeds the power of 
the arbitrator." Couch on Insurance 3d, §213:40. 
Moreover, this is true even if the issue of policy limits was not before the 
arbitrator. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303(9)(h) & (i); Couch on Insurance 3d, 
§213:40, n.3; Meade v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, 423 So. 2d 908, 910 
(Fla. 1982) (holding where policy limits were not an issue in the arbitration, insurer could 
raise limits as defense to award exceeding policy limits notwithstanding fact award was 
not challenged within statutorily prescribed time); Kutch, 960 P.2d at 98 (providing that 
where both parties elected to withhold information as to the policy limits from the 
arbitrator, insurer could have filed motion to vacate award on theory that arbitration panel 
exceeded its powers). In this case, the first arbitration agreement, on which Wong now 
attempts to rely in claiming that his contract for insurance was properly before the 
arbitrator, was not submitted to the arbitrator. Besides, the agreement contains no such 
provision. The parties agreed the first arbitration agreement would not be submitted and 
agreed evidence of Wong's contract for insurance would not be submitted. Consistent 
with Utah law and the other jurisdictions which have examined this issue, the Court of 
Appeals correctly determined the arbitration award did not affect Allstate's obligation 
under its contract for insurance with Wong. Because this contract created the only basis 
for Wong to recover against Allstate, the Court of Appeals correctly determined Wong 
should recover only $100,000 as provided by his contract. 
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ISSUE III 
ARBITRATION IS AN INFORMAL AND EXPEDITIOUS PROCESS WHICH 
RELIES ON THE PARTIES ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR 
AGREEMENTS AND IN GOOD FAITH. 
Wong's arguments would turn arbitration into an uncertain process, 
discouraging parties from including arbitration provisions in their contracts or from 
voluntarily submitting to alternative dispute resolution. In its current state, parties rely on 
arbitration to resolve a dispute in an efficient manner without the costs and time required 
in litigation. Also, arbitration normally provides a greater level of predictability in 
outcome than many types of litigation. Wong, however, is attempting to create a 
tremendous level of uncertainty in the process, and to use arbitration to get more than he 
bargained for in his contract for insurance. Despite his knowledge that Allstate entered 
the arbitration with the good faith understanding that the policy limits of Wongfs contract 
for insurance set the ceiling on his recovery, Wong has forced Allstate to seek relief from 
the trial court, appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals and raised the issue on certiorari to 
this Court. 
If parties are able to avoid bargained-for contractual obligations by taking 
positions at odds with the plain language of their contract and are able to avoid pre-
arbitration agreements, arbitration will no longer exist as an expeditious alternative to 
litigation. Instead, arbitration will be viewed solely as a preliminary step to further 
judicial action. (Allstate realizes that after the arbitration it filed for judicial assistance, 
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but it did so only because of the extreme bad faith of Wong and his counsel in refusing to 
accept the obvious and indisputable fact that Wong's recovery was limited by the terms of 
the insurance contract.) 
This Court has noted Mthat the Utah Arbitration Act 'reflects long-standing 
public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes.1" Buzas 
Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996). For the second 
time, Wong is seeking appellate review of the trial court's correct determination that the 
arbitration did not affect the terms of his contract for insurance. f"[J]udicial review of 
arbitration awards should not be pervasive in scope or encourage repetitive adjudications 
but should be limited to the statutory grounds and procedures for review/" Buzas 
Baseball 925 P.2d at 947 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Importantly, this 
Court has stated: f"an arbitration award will not be disturbed . . . because the court does 
not agree with the award as long as the proceeding was fair and honest and the substantial 
rights of the parties were respected/" Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
The above standards articulate three important purposes of arbitrations: (1) 
they provide an informal, expeditious process for resolving disputes; (2) the parties act 
with honesty towards the arbitration process and other parties; and (3) the parties' rights 
are not compromised by the process. In contrast to these principles, Wong has 
consistently attempted to manipulate the arbitration process to achieve a result to which 
he is not entitled. The presence of a binding contract for insurance is the only reason 
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Allstate owes an obligation towards Wong. This fact is not in dispute. The terms of this 
contract are also not in dispute. Wong's contract for insurance provides coverage up to, 
but not exceeding, $100,000 for an underinsured motorist claim. (R. at 6, 22,142) 
Regardless of how the issue is presented or couched, the real issue on 
appeal is whether a party to a contract can manipulate arbitration to re-write the terms of 
the contract, without notice to the arbitrator or the other party, to achieve a better result 
than the contract provides. Allstate proceeded with the arbitration with the understanding 
that neither party would submit evidence of the policy limits to the arbitrator in order to 
allow the arbitrator to render a more objective award of damages. (R. at 16-17, 57, 58) 
Indeed, it is quite common for parties to agree not to submit evidence of policy limits to 
the arbitrator. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(9)(h) & (i); Applehans v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 68 P.3d 594 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (remanding case for 
determination of whether agreement not to present policy limits was present and requiring 
award be vacated if parties agreed not to present policy limits at arbitration). With this 
understanding in place, Allstate submitted the issue of Wong's damages to the arbitrator 
with a reasonable and good faith expectation that any award would be limited to the 
policy limits set forth in Wong's contract for insurance. Consistent with the parties' 
agreement, Allstate immediately sent Wong a check for the full amount of his contract for 
insurance after the arbitrator's award exceeded the policy limits of Wong's contract. 
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Additionally, if this court were to adopt Wong's argument, it would have 
chilling effect on future arbitration between insurers and insureds. As applied to 
subsequent arbitrations, no insurer would ever agree to not present evidence of the 
applicable insurance policy and its terms. This would be contrary to established 
procedures in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309, but would be necessary in order for 
insurers to avoid exposure for recoveries in excess of the applicable coverage. In short, 
an objective review by an arbitrator without knowledge of limits on recovery will cease to 
exist. Furthermore, parties could not even stipulate to such a procedure. For as in this 
case, any pre-arbitration agreement to not disclose insurance contracts would be subject 
to judicial review and waiver arguments-like Wong's on this appeal. 
When Wong declined to accept the full amount of his policy and demanded 
instead the amount of damages he had sustained in the accident as reflected in the 
arbitration award, Allstate was forced to file a motion to vacate or amend the award with 
the district court pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act in order to preserve its contractual 
rights. In requesting a recovery in excess of his contract for insurance, Wong has turned 
this matter into protracted litigation by forcing Allstate to seek judicial intervention and 
by appealing this matter from both courts. No doubt, Wong would argue that Allstate is 
the one who first sought judicial intervention. This argument, however, ignores that 
Wong forced Allstate to seek judicial relief by refusing to honor the parties' pre-
arbitration agreement and his contract for insurance. If parties to arbitration are required 
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to seek judicial intervention to interpret and enforce arbitration awards, the purpose for 
submitting disputes to arbitration is vitiated. Parties to arbitration must be able to rely on 
contractual limitations, pre-arbitration agreements and good faith conduct if arbitration is 
to work successfully. This Court should not sanction conduct which is inconsistent with 
the policy objectives of arbitration. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, Allstate requests this Court 
affirm the Court of Appeals1 determination that the arbitration award did not affect the 
contract between the parties which limited Wong's recovery to the terms of the contract. 
The parties agreed to not submit evidence of Wong's insurance contract to the arbitrator. 
This agreement, however, did not affect the parties1 contract for insurance which 
expressly limited Wong's recovery to $100,000. This Court should affirm the Court of 
Appeals' decision limiting Wong's recovery to $100,000 and grant such other and further 
relief as it deems appropriate consistent with the Court of Appeals' disposition of the case. 
DATED this *7 day of March, 2005. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
LJNN S. DAVIES 
^ACHARY E. PETERSON 
Attorneys for Respondent Allstate Ins. Co. 
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f 7a Facsimile Transmission to 28H-9414 
Leonard E. McGee. Esq. 
Stegall & .Associates 
6056 Fashion Square Drive, Suite 200 
Murray. Utah 84107 
RE: Dixon Wong v. Allstate 
Dear Leonard: 
This is a follow-up to our recent conversation this morning regarding my client, Dixon 
Wong, and the upcoming arbitration. I want to confirm that our agreement pursuant to the 
Arbitration Agreement is that this matter will be arbitrated with no consideration for a binding 
high/low agreement. This is evidenced by the Arbitration Agreement signed by you well after 
the amendments/changes were made. Furthermore, it is important to note that nothing in Mr. 
Wong's contract of insurance with Allstate requires that he be bound by a high/low agreement. 
We have agreed that the arbitrator will not be made aware of either the terms of the 
Arbitration Agreement or the policy limits under the subject policy. In short, the arbitrator will 
be afforded the opportunity to award what he believes Mr. Wong's claim is worth, vvhatever that 
figure may be. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
Stegall & Associates 
Staff Counsel for A lisiaie Insurance Company 6056 Fashion Square Dr., 
and Encompass Insurance Ste. 200, 
Murray, UT 84107 
William A. Stegall, Esq. M1-28M788 Pharut 
Unnard E. McGee, Esq, S01-2SS-94J4 Fax 
May 15, 2002 
fVIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION) 
266-1338^ 
Preston L. Handy, Esq. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
Re: Wong v. Allstare Insurance 
Court Case No. 
Dear Mr. Handy: 
I am in receipt of your letter dated May 14, 2002 regarding the above case. 
I agree with you that there is not a high/low agreement in place regarding the upcoming 
arbitration in this mauer; however, it is Allstate Insurance Company's position (as it has been 
from the beginning of this case) that Mr. Wong is stil! bound by the $100,000.00 contractual 
limit of his insurance policy, notwithstanding whatever amount the arbitrator may award. 
After a review of Dr. Howe's report, I have been authorized to extend an offer of 
$70,000.00, new money, to settle Mr. Wong's claim. Please Jet me know your client's 
response to this latest offer. 
Sincerely, 
STEGALL & ASSOCIATES 
& — 
Leonard E. McGee 
LEM:rIh 
